|H5N1 virion. Photo Cynthia Goldsmith/Jackie Katz|
Two years ago, a controversy emerged about the research on influenza virus H5N1, and the potential risk associated with it. This controversy followed the publication of two research articles in Science and Nature, and I wrote about it in January 2012 in this blog post. Briefly, scientists have used so-called “gain-of-functions” experiments, in which strains of influenza viruses are selected for new traits such as higher transmissibility between ferrets (the preferred animal model in these studies). The objections that were raised by some critics of this research were of two kinds: first, the information available in these papers could be used by terrorists in order to produce bioweapons; second, modified influenza viruses could escape the lab by accident and create a pandemic. The first objection led to a very rare decision in scientific publishing, namely the redaction of the articles to remove potentially sensitive data. The important public concern also led the authors of these studies to promulgate a moratorium on this type of work. After this temporary stop, the experiments started again with additional biosafety measures.
The debate, however, is far from over. The reason for this? Well, the recent publications of several studies dealing with influenza virus, most notably a paper by Y. Kawaoka (the author of the 2012 Nature publication) on avian influenza viruses related to the 1918 “Spanish flu” virus. This research triggered a heated response from several scientists, which was loudly echoed in the mainstream press (see for instance in the Guardian and in the Independent). In that particular case, it seems that the scientific community is truly divided on the matter. An example of this dissent was the publication of a statement of concern by a group of scientists known as the Cambridge Working Group, which in essence asked for a better assessment of the risks of virus research via the organization of a conference that would deal with all present issues. Such a meeting could resemble the famous Asilomar conference of 1975, where the risks associated with recombinant DNA were debated. Other virologists, however, have fought back these reactions of distrust and have created another group, Scientists for Science, which aims at promoting the benefits of this research, and highlight the fact that serious safety regulations are already in place for virus research.